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NEW YORK TROIKA: CONFLICTING ROLES OF THE GRAND JURY
J. DOUGLAS COOK*
You ... shall diligently inquire and true presentment make, of all
such matters and things as shall be given you in charge; the counsel
of the people of this state, your fellows' and your own you shall keep
secret; you shall present no person from envy, hatred or malice; nor
shall you leave any one unpresented through fear, favor, affection or
reward, or hope thereof; but you shall present all things truly as they
come to your knowledge, according to the best of your understanding.
So help you God!1
Extravagantly praised2 and bitterly condemned,3 unique in its trebly di-
verse and conflicting roles of "Public Inquisitor, Protector, and Reporter," the
grand jury has been depicted by its defenders as the one institution developed
by the Anglo-American legal system which most dramatically characterizes the
ideal of popular justice. Paradoxically it has been the object of regular and
repeated attempts at modification or abrogation; 4 in New York the most recent
and effective effort has been an assault on the grand jury's role of public
reporter.
In Wood v. Hughes,5 the Court of Appeals has ruled that a grand jury
has no authority to file as a public record with the court a report concerning
alleged misconduct in public office where the underlying investigation did not
disclose evidence warranting an indictment. The practice of filing such reports
(frequently but inaccurately referred to as presentments)0 has long been a
controversial matter. 7 ]Both the authority for and the propriety of the pro-
cedure have been questioned, but until this decision the issue had not been
squarely faced by other than the lower courts.8
Wood was the foreman of the May, 1959, Term of the Grand Jury for the
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Buffalo.
1. This is the grand juror's oath as embodied in the New York Code of Criminal
Procedure § 245. It appears not to have been changed substantially from the "Oath of
the Great Inquest" adopted during the time of Queen Elizabeth. 1 Hamlin & Baker, Su-
preme Court of Judicature of the Province of New York 1691-1704, at 154 (1959).
2. See Current Notes, Dewey Speaks on Grand Jury, 32 J. Crim. L., C. & P. S. 217
(1941); Younger, The Grand Jury Under Attack, 46 J. Crim. L., C. & P. S. 26, 214 (1955).
3. See Kranitz, The Grand Jury: Past-Present-No Future, 24 Mo. L. Rev. 318
(1959) ; Vukasin; Useful or Useless-The Grand Jury, 34 Cal. State Bar J. 436 (1959).
4. 1 National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on Prosecu-
tion 33, 124-26 (1931) ; 9 New York State Constitutional Committee, Problems Relating to
Judicial Administration and Organization 864 (1938); A. L. I. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 113, 114.
5. 9 N.Y.2d 144, 212 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1961).
6. A presentment is an accusation originating with the grand jury, rather than with
the prosecutor, which must be drawn into a bill of indictment and resubmitted to the jury.
Orfield, Criminal Procedure from Arrest to Appeal 157 (1947).
7. See Bennett v. Kalamazoo Circuit Judge, 183 Mich. 200, 150 N.W. 141 (1914);
In re Report of Grand Jury, 204 Wis. 409, 235 N.W. 789 (1931); In re Report of
Grand Jury, 152 Fla. 154, 11 So.2d 316 (1943).
8. The only appellate decision hearing on this issue upheld the filing of a critical
report. Jones v. People, 101 App. Div. 55, 92 N.Y.Supp. 275 (2d Dep't 1905), appeal dis-
missed, 181 N.Y. 389, 74 N.E. 226 (1905).
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County of Schenectady; as foreman he sought to have filed and made public
a nineteen page report criticizing the practices of the Schenectady County High-
way Department, although the grand jury's investigation had yielded no basis
for an indictment. The report did not name the individuals involved in the
alleged derelictions but there was "little doubt as to identity." The Supreme
Court Justice who had presided over the May Term, Charles M. Hughes,
received the report but ordered it sealed; whereupon, Wood initiated a pro-
ceeding9 to compel Hughes to file the report as a public record. In a 4-3
decision Fuld, J., affirmed the Appellate Division's dismissal of the petition,
holding that there is no authorization, constitutional or statutory, for the filing
of a grand jury report. The majority decision states that a grand jury inquiry
must result in either an indictment or a dismissal of charges; otherwise it must
remain silent. Desmond, C. J., and Froessel, J., dissented in separate opinions
concurred in by Burke, J.
Conceding that, in the absence of conflicting sections, the New York Con-
stitution continues the common law as the law of the State subject to legislative
alteration,"0 Judge Fuld interprets the failure to authorize grand jury reports
by specific provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure as a manifestation of
legislative intent to eliminate their use. Consequently, the majority opinion
rejects any examination of the historical development of the grand jury and its
powers as pointless and moot. Conversely, the dissenters view the omission as
a refusal to abolish the traditional grand jury practices and suggest that since
the grand jury is required to inquire into misconduct of public officers,"1 the
power to report is necessarily implied in order to implement this function.
Here the issue is one of statutory interpretation, or rather, an interpreta-
tion of statutory omission. Justice Frankfurter has observed that in this area
the scope of free judicial movement is considerable, and that
A judge must not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor to contract
it. Whatever temptations the statesmanship of policymaking might
wisely suggest, construction must eschew interpolation and eviscera-
tion. He must not read in by way of creation. He must not read out
except to avoid patent nonsense or internal contradiction.1
2
9. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act, art. 78.
10. Such parts of the common law, and of the acts of the legislature of the colony
of New York, as together did form the law of the said colony, on the nineteenth
day of April, one thousand seven hundred seventy-five, and the resolutions of the
congress of the said colony, and of the convention of the State of New York, in
force on the twentieth day of April, one thousand seven hundred seventy-seven,
which have not since expired, or been repealed or altered; and such acts of the
legislature of this state as are now in force, shall be and continue the law of this
state, subject to such alteration as the legislature shall make concerning the same.
But all such parts of the common law, and such of the said acts, or parts thereof,
as are repugnant to this constitution, are hereby abrogated.
N.Y. Const. art. I, § 14.
11. The grand jury must inquire, ....
2. Into the wilful and corrupt misconduct in office of public officers of every
description, in the county. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 253.
12. Frankfurter, The Supreme Court: Views from Inside 81 (Westin ed. 1961).
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Even though in disagreement as to the merits of probing into history,
tradition, and practice, 13 the majority and minority opinions alike give recog-
nition to the social and political effects implicit in the reportorial role of the
grand jury. It would seem that resolution of the question would compel at
least a brief examination of grand jury function in all of its aspects, from
common law evolvement to current use and effectiveness.
The origin of the jury system is somewhat uncertain. Maitland defined
the jury as "a body of neighbours summoned by a public officer to answer
questions upon oath."'1 4 Using Maitland's definition one writer suggests that
Moses' selection of the twelve tribal leaders to investigate and report on con-
ditions in the land of Canaan may be the earliest recorded use of the jury.1'
Dean Wigmore concluded that the earliest description of democratic justice in
the form of jury trial is to be found in The Iliad, Book XVIII.'1 There are
indications that the Athenians had developed a complicated jury system, at
least by the time of the celebrated trial of Socrates, and that the jury's power
extended into areas other than the trial of cases. 17
It is not unusual for different nations to independently develop similar prin-
ciples or institutions; no one contends that the English grand jury was derived
from its Athenian counterpart. Yet, there is considerable disagreement as to
whether the modern jury system was a Norman institution adopted after the
conquest' 8 or a product of the English system of frank-pledge'0 or a blending
of both.
The laws of Ethelred II provided that twelve senior thanes of each hun-
dred should go out with the reeve and accuse those who had committed any
offense.2 0 This may have been new law when promulgated about 997 A.D.,
but it is just as likely that it merely clarified a matter of custom. The accused
13. Desmond, C.J., states:
The question here is one of positive law, of Constitution and statute as explained
by history and tradition.
Supra note S at 160, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
14. 1 Pollock and Maitland, The History of English Law 117 (1903).
15. Pope, The Jury, 39 Texas L. Rev. 426 (1961). The Biblical account may be found
in the Old Testament, Numbers 13.
16. 1 Wigmore, A Panorama of the World's Legal Systems 287 (1928).
17. Wigmore relied on the Kenyon translation of Aristotle's monograph on the "Gov-
ernment of Athens" in reaching the following conclusion:
Jury-trial, as thus organized, was much more than our modern expedient for deter-
mining private claims and ordinary criminal charges. It was also, in effect, a chief
engine for controlling the government.
Id. at 301.
18. Orfield, Criminal Procedure from Arrest to Appeal 141 (1947) [hereinafter cited
as Orfield].
19. Edwards, The Grand Jury 4 (1906) [hereinafter cited as Edwards].
20. This passage appeared in Ethelred's law promulgated at Wantage in the year 997:
And that a gemot be held in every wapontake; and the xii senior thegns go out,
and the reeve with them, and swear on the relic that is given them in band, that
they will accuse no innocent man, nor conceal any guilty one. ...
Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 108 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Pluck-
nett].
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could avoid trial by paying weregild; otherwise he was tried by compurgation
or ordeal.21
At about the same time the Normans were using a trial jury called the
N~mnd or Nambda. It was not, however, an accusing jury; 22 the Norman
method of accusation was by appeal. A private person made the criminal
charge against another and the issue was resolved by physical battle. The
concept of jury trial was brought into England with the other customs of the
invaders, including the trial by battle. There is an informational gap of about
one hundred years between the law of Ethelred and the conquest, and another
one hundred year gap between the conquest and the next published law dealing
with the accusing jury, the Assize of Clarendon. Plucknett states that until
continuity can be established between Ethelred's law and the Assize of Claren-
don, it is unsafe to credit the Anglo-Danes with the origin of the grand jury.
2 3
William the Conqueror made extensive use of the inquest, a Norman
administrative device (probably of Frankish origin) ,24 to obtain useful informa-
tion for governmental purposes, the answer being recorded in the Domesday
Book.25 Since William's successors used inquisitions for the determination of
private rights as an occasional favor to a church or individual upon request,2 6
the principle of jury determination of civil issues was soon established. But
criminal matters were still disposed of by the ancient methods supplemented
by the Norman appeal and battle.2 7 If we may assume that accusations were
brought by the twelve thanes in the hundred at the sheriff's tourns, then it is
reasonable to believe that the Saxon form of accusation would be preferred by
those complainants unwilling to assume the risks of combat. Whether public
preference was a factor or not, the need for royal revenue was sufficient basis
for the establishment of the inquisition as part of the criminal process in 1166.
The Assize of Clarendon provided
that inquiry shall be made in every county and in every hundred by
the twelve most lawful men of the hundred and by the four most
lawful men of every vill, upon oath that they shall speak the truth,
21. Compurgation was a sort of character test based on the accused producing a
specified number of witnesses who would swear to believe his oath. The usual ordeals
were fire and water. The defendant was required to hold a hot iron, or to place his hand
in boiling water. If the hand healed in three days the accused was discharged. The ordeal
of water involved lowering the bound defendant into a pool; if he sank a certain specified
distance he was guilty; otherwise he was innocent. In later times the practice was some-
times known as swimming a witch.
Such ordeals were obviously direct appeals to the supernatural and were conducted
with solemnity under the aegis of the Church.




24. 1 Pollock & Maitland, supra note 14 at 141.
25. Plucknett 111.
26. Id. at 110.
27. The appeal and trial by battle was in common use for at least two hundred years
after the Conquest. The right to appeal existed in theory until 1819. Radcliffe & Cross 37.
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whether in their hundred or vill there be any man who is accused or
believed to be a robber, murderer, thief, or a receiver of robbers,
murderers or thieves since the King's accession. And this the justices
and sheriffs shall enquire before themselves.
28
It will be seen that the Crown now had a part in criminal proceedings
involving the enumerated offenses through the use of the King's justices, a
feature lacking in Ethelred's law. Once the defendant was accused he still
had to be tried by ordeal or compurgation, although the latter method might
not entirely clear a defendant if of bad character.29 It is believed that corn-
purgation was largely abandoned as a result of the provisions of the Assize of
Clarendon.3 0 To complicate methods still further, the Fourth Lateran Council
in 1215 forbade the clergy to participate in the ordeals. Subsequently, Henry III
in recognition of clerical disapproval authorized his justices to use their dis-
cretion as to proof of guilt.8 1 Gradually, and not without difficulty, the justices
adopted the device of jury trial in criminal matters, first with the same jury
that had presented the accused, later with a separate trial jury.
For a time the justices were reluctant to compel an accused to accept this
substitute for the ordeal, but eventually the law required submission to jury
trial or imprisonment and torture until such jurisdiction was admitted.32 There
were defendants who died in prison without accepting jury trial, possibly be-
cause the property of one who died without being convicted of a felony did
not become forfeit to the crown. Probably many defendants who did submit
would have preferred the ordeal to a trial by the same jurors who had con-
stituted the presenting jury, since the accusing jurors often made their accusa-
tions on a basis of personal knowledge. However, by 1352 a trial juror could
be challenged if he had served on the presenting jury,8 3 and by 1368 the old
procedure of drawing a jury from the hundred was replaced by a sheriff's
return of a county wide panel of twenty-four knights known as "le graunde
28. Plucknett 113.
29. The Assize of Clarendon also had provided:
The lord King also wishes that those who make their law and clear themselves shall,
nevertheless, forswear the King's land if they are of bad renown and publicly and
evilly reputed by the testimony of many lawful men, and cross the sea within eight
days unless detained by the weather, and with the first favourable wind they shall
cross the sea and never come back to England save by the King's permission, and
shall be outlawed, and if they come back shall be captured as outlaws.
Plucknett 113.
30. Thayer, The Older Modes of Trial, 5 Harv. L. Rev. 59 (1891).
31. Plucknett 119.
It should be noted that at this time indictment and the appeal were not the only methods
of initiating criminal proceedings. During the reign of Edward I, Longshanks (1272-1307)
the king could bring a man to trial for treason or felony by information, that is, by com-
plaint filed by a royal official without grand jury indictment. This right was gradually
restricted to misdemeanors. Orfield 95.
32. But mostly the trial judges resorted to piene forte et dure. The accused was
cast into prison, ironed, and laid on the ground; a little water was given him one
day and a little bread the next: weights were piled on him and added to day by
day; and there he was kept unless or until he put himself upon the country ....
Snyder, Criminal Justice 69 (1953).
33. 25 Edward III, stat. 5, c. 3; Plucknett 127, note 5.
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inquest.134 At this point the development of the jury system had reached the
point where the grand and petit jury were approximately the same as the
modern institutions.
From the beginning (whether Anglo-Saxon or Norman) the grand jury
had an inquisitorial function; it had to present those accused of crime. In the
absence of an organized constabulary force its duties were probably more
extensive than investigation and accusation, and probably included apprehen-
sion and detention.
And from the time of the Norman Conquest the grand jury had a repor-
torial function, first as the information gathering agency for the early Angevins,
and later as the proclaimer of facts useful to local administrative problems. In
the Middle Ages the grand jury was the unit of local government most con-
cerned with calling to the attention of the court and the public any matters
affecting the good order of the community. It was a function of the grand jury
to report on these conditions and to name individuals who had neglected public
obligations.3 5 With the development of more complicated and efficient systems
of local representative government, the reportorial role became less significant,
but it continued to be exercised down through the colonial period and later.3 6
The grand jury's symbolic role of Public Protector, based on popular
acclaim, evolved more slowly, as the institution demonstrated its independence
of political control and royal tyranny. In two celebrated cases, that of Stephen
College3 7 and that of the Earl of Shaftesbury,38 both occurring in 1681, the
grand jury under governmental pressure refused to relinquish the right to hear
witnesses and to deliberate in secret; in both cases the grand jury refused to
indict the defendants for treason. At this point the institution had approached
the zenith of reputation as the bulwark of English individual freedoms; further-
more, all three roles, inquisitor, reporter, and protector, had sufficiently devel-
oped in time to permit a healthy transplant to colonial America.
Common law criminal procedures were generally followed in colonial New
York until the adoption of the Constitution of 1777." At the first session of
the General Court of Assizes in October 1665, the minutes record a grand jury
34. Edwards 26.
35. Radcliffe & Cross 198.
36. If anyone takes the trouble to read the old sessions papers published by various
counties from time to time, he will find that they are full of cases down to the
reign of Queen Victoria of the grand jury presenting all manner of things to the
court which in those days was really the origin of local government for the county
in such matters as roads, which they knew to be out of repair, bridges which were
in a dangerous condition, public nuisances, disorderly houses, gaming houses and
the like, either of their own knowledge or from information given to them.
Regina v. Chairman, County of London Quarter Sessions, 1 Q.B. 5 (1954).
37. 8 How. St. Tr. 550 (1681).
38. 8 How. St. Tr. 774 (1681).
39. 9 New York State Constitutional Convention Committee, Problems Relating to
Judicial Administration and Organization 850 (1938) [hereinafter referred to as Consti-
tutional Convention].
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as having served. 40 Prosecutions were not limited to those initiated by grand
jury, however, and persons were accused by information and complaints as
well.41 In 1691 an act was passed by the colonial assembly providing that "In
all Cases Capitall or Criminall there shall be a grand Inquest who shall first
present the offense and then twelve men of the neighbourhood to try the
Offender who after his plea to the Indictment shall be allowed his reasonable
Challenges."1
4 2
The right to indictment became a tradition, although it was still a matter
of right only in capital cases. In many instances, the government was fearful
of the reaction of colonial grand juries and preferred to initiate prosecutions
with informations filed by the attorney general or some other royal official.
Needless to say, this was and continued to be a source of irritation and
grievance to the colonists.
43
Almost inevitably, as had happened in England some fifty years earlier,
a celebrated trial helped to establish in the popular mind a concept of the grand
jury as protector of the liberties of the people. This was the case of John Peter
Zenger, 44 accused in 1735 of libelling the royal governor in the New York
Weekly Journal. A grand jury refused to indict him, despite the urgings of
the Chief Justice. The trial jury acquitted Zenger after he had been brought
to trial by information. 45 In an impassioned and eloquent plea, Andrew Ham-
ilton, a Philadelphia lawyer, argued:
... yet Old and Weak as I am, I should think it my duty, if required,
to go to the utmost Part of the Land, where my Service could be of
any Use in assisting to quench the Flame of Prosecutions upon Infor-
mations set on Foot by the Government, to deprive a People of the
Right of Remonstrating, and complaining too, of the arbitrary
attempts of men in Power .... 46
This popular verdict, confirming as it did the independence of the jury, grand
and petit, and the freedom of the press, was a topic of conversation in all of
the colonies and in England as well.
47
It is not surprising that the reportorial function of the grand jury con-
tinued in the Colony of New York as it had in the mother country. In fact
40. 1 Hamlin & Baker, Supreme Court of Judicature of the Province of New York
1691-1704, 142 (1959) [hereinafter referred to as Hamlin & Baker].
41. Id. at 144.
42. Id. at 147.
43. As late as 1727 we find the Grievance Committee of the Assembly reporting that:
. . . many of his Majesty's leige Subjects have of late been prosecuted in their
respective Counties, upon Informations filed against them by the Attorney General,
or his Deputies, and other compelled to defend the same, in the [Supream] Court
at the City of New-York, tho' the matters charged upon them, have often been
trivial.
Id. at 149 & n. 16.
44. 17 How. St. Tr. 675 (1735).
45. Edwards 32.
46. 17 How. St. Tr. 721 (1735).
47. Marke, Peter Zenger's Trial and Freedom of the Press, N. Y. U. L. Cent. Bull.,
Sum. 1961, p 8.
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the first colonial legislative assembly was created after a grand jury had peti-
tioned the Duke of York for a body "Duly elected by the Freeholders of this
Collony by whom .. . we may Enjoy the benefitt of the Good and wholsome
Laws of the Realme of England .... -48 The grand juries continued to assist
the courts by reporting and "presenting" matters relating to the public welfare,
such as negligence of public officers, uncleaned docks, and persons "playing
publickly on the streets on Sundays.
'49
With the adoption of the Constitution of 1777, the grand jury, which was
not mentioned, continued as at common law, since that Constitution provided
that the common law of England and the laws of the colonial legislature that
were in force in the colony on April 19, 1775, should continue to be the laws
of the state, until and unless altered.50 That provision continued in subsequent
adoptions and is found in the present Constitution as amended. 5' In later
adopted Constitutions specific provision was made that no person should be
held to answer for crime unless first indicted by a grand jury. The present
Constitution continues the requirement of grand jury indictment,52 but makes
no reference to the grand jury power to report; neither does the Code of
Criminal Procedure.53 In the absence of clear provision to abrogate the com-
mon law it would seem that the powers and practices of the common law grand
jury had been continued. Certainly grand juries continued to investigate, to
indict, and to file censorious reports; but the reporting practice began to be
the subject of criticism. Occasionally, the courts would order reports or portions
of them expunged, but the lower court decisions "left a trail of confusion" on
the issue of legality of reports.
5 4
By the time of the Constitutional Convention of 1938 a number of changes
had occurred in the functioning of grand juries in other jurisdictions which
suggested possible solutions for New York. One of the principal developments
in the United States had been a trend toward the use of informations filed by
a prosecuting official as an alternative to grand jury indictment. Only twenty
states, 5 including New York, prohibited felony prosecutions except on indict-
ment. (A New York statute authorizing a waiver of indictment was held un-
48. 1 Hamlin & Baker 146.
49. Id. at 154.
50. Wood v. Hughes, supra note 5 at 158, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
51. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 14.
52. No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime
(except in cases of impeachment, and in cases of militia when in actual service,
and the land, air and naval forces in time of war, or which this state may keep
with the consent of congress in time of peace, and in cases of petit larceny, under
the regulation of the legislature), unless on indictment of a grand jury. ...
N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6.
53. See N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 223-260.
54. 9 Constitutional Convention 863.
55. Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Texas, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Virginia. Id. at 849.
49
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
constitutional in 1928.)56 Nineteen states57 authorized felony prosecutions to
be initiated on either indictment or information, a so-called "dual-system."
Seven states permitted the use of a dual-system only as to certain crimes, and
required grand jury indictment for others.58 Two states permitted waiver of
indictment as the only exception to a general requirement. No state had gone
as far as elimination of the grand jury altogether, something the English had
substantially accomplished by legislation in 1933.59
In addition, the forces of reform had provoked numerous local, state, and
national crime surveys in an effort to re-evaluate the American systems of
criminal law enforcement.6° In general, these surveys found the grand jury
system defective and inefficient, but still capable of rendering useful service in
limited circumstances or in functions adaptable to the grand jury only.01 Essen-
tially the reformers had suggested the advantages of an information system as
opposed to the indictment system, but had endorsed the reportorial function
of the grand jury.
Although aware of the highly publicized criticisms made in other jurisdic-
tions to the extent that proposed alternative accusatory systems were consid-
ered,62 the Constitutional Convention of 1938 made no revision of the grand
jury's functions. On the contrary, an amendment designed to protect the
indictment process from judicial or legislative alteration was introduced, and
subsequently adopted. 63 And this was done despite the recommendation of the
1935 Governor's Conference on Crime, the Criminal and Society that New
York adopt an alternative or dual system of accusation by information or
indictment,64 a proposal substantially endorsed by Governor Herbert Lehman.05
56. People ex rel. Battista v. Christian, 249 N.Y. 314, 164 N.E. 111 (1928).
57. Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, Washing-
ton, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 9 Constitutional Convention 849.
58. Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Vermont.
Ibid.
59. Administration of Justice Act, 23 and 24 Geo. 5, c. 36 (1933).
60. E.g., National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (1931); Crim-
inal Justice in Cleveland (1922); Illinois Crime Survey (1929); Missouri Crime Survey
(1926); Report of the Minnesota Crime Commission (1934).
61. Today the grand jury is useful only as a general investigating body for in-
quiring into the conduct of public officers and in case of large conspiracies. It
should be retained as an occasional instrument for such purposes, and the require-
ment of it as a necessary basis of all prosecutions for infamous crimes should be
done away with.
National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on Prosecution 37
(1931).
62. 9 Constitutional Convention 864.
63. The power of grand juries to inquire into the wilful misconduct in office of
public officers, and to find indictments or to direct the filing of informations in
connection with such inquiries, shall never be suspended or impaired by law.
N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6.
64. It is proposed by the Commission that crimes may be prosecuted either by
indictment or information, within the discretion of the district attorney, in cases
where there has been a hearing before a committing magistrate, or such hearing
has been waived.
State of New York, Proceedings of the Governor's Conference on Crime, the Criminal
and Society 118 (1936?).
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The last significant attempt to modify the functional scope of the grand
jury occurred in 1946 when the legislature passed a bill forbidding the filing
of censorious reports directed against alleged misconduct amounting to less
than a crime. It was vetoed by Governor Thomas Dewey, who stated that any
weakening of the grand jury's power "would be an irreparable loss to the
citizens of a free community."
66
Interestingly, the majority opinion and the minority opinions cite the 1938
amendment (Art. I, § 6) as supporting their respective and opposing interpre-
tations of the reportorial prerogative. 6 7 Even less helpful is the dissenters'
suggestion that the action of the 1946 legislature constitutes recognition of the
power to report, when the position of the majority is based on their interpre-
tation of the intent of the framers of the procedural code (1849) and the
intent of the legislature which adopted the pertinent sections in 1881.
If the original Code of Criminal Procedure had been intended by the
draftsmen, or by the legislature, to exclude and abolish any existent common
law procedures not specifically mentioned, it would have been logical to clearly
enunciate such a principle in the code itself. This was done in the Penal Law;
Section 22 provides in substance that no act or omission shall be deemed
criminal except as authorized by the Penal Law. Without this provision the
common law of crimes would apply to areas of omission. Even with such a
provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure there would be some difficulty in
reconciling the reportorial function of the grand jury with criminal procedure
at all.
A careful reading of the majority opinion leads one to the unassuaged
conclusion that the Wood decision is based on policy, policy determined by a
value judgment alone. There is much to be said against the too liberal use of
the grand jury report, but historical fact cannot be denied by mere disapproval.
In any event, the Wood decision,' good or bad, is now the law of the
state, and we are left with the question of grand jury survival. Is the mutilated
veteran to be revived with rehabilitative surgery, or assigned to limited duty
only, or honorably discharged from further service? A judicious determination
of that question requires an exhaustive examination into all of the aspects of
the grand jury system, including its effectiveness as compared to possible alter-
natives, something beyond the scope of this discussion. However, even a pre-
liminary consideration of the problem suggests that certain conflicts in grand
jury roles may predetermine the outcome of such an inquiry.
Although historically, the grand jury did act as a protector of individual
65. In a special message to the legislature, dated January 7, 1936, Governor Lehman
stated:
I recommend a constitutional amendment providing that a district attorney may
proceed by information instead of by indictment of a grand jury, on consent of
the accused, in a manner to be provided by the legislature.
Id. at 1230.
66. Wood v. Hughes, supra note 5 at 158, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
67. Id. at 150, 156, and 164, 173 N.E.2d at 24, 27, and 32.
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right, and did effectively intervene between citizen and despot, does it so pro-
tect the citizen today, and from whom? With a long established system of
representative government, and even elected prosecuting officials, the possibili-
ties of arbitrary political persecution are greatly diminished, if not altogether
eliminated. In actual fact it seems that the public prosecutor is the one who
receives the protection. 68 The secrecy of the proceedings prevents the accused
from knowing what evidence is to be used against him. Secret hearings help,
to conceal the identity of informers and witnesses, at least until the time of
trial; and the secrecy of the grand jury hearing is supposed to protect the
prosecutors's case from the possibility of perjured defenses, intimidated wit-
nesses, 69 and absconding defendants. 70 And in New York the grand jury hear-
ing can be used by the prosecutor to prevent a preliminary examination, so
that the prosecutor's case will not be exposed to even this limited form of
discovery.
71
If it be conceded that the role of protector of liberties is not what it once
was, and we eliminate the unique role of reporter, of what significance is the
inquisitorial role? There appears to be conflict here, too. This is an era that
has proudly produced scientific crime laboratories and professionalism in law
enforcement, yet many would insist on maintaining a body of citizen investi-
gators. Supporters of the system deny that grand juries rubber stamp the
conclusions of the police and prosecutors,72 but also deny that investigations
by the amateur inquisitors duplicate the investigations already completed, and
68. The prosecutor may use the grand jury as a screen to conceal decision actually
made by him and rubber stamped by the jurors: these decisions can be either for or against
indictment. Thus, he has a medium for the shifting of responsibility and any consequent
public criticism. See Moreland, Modern Criminal Procedure 201 (1959).
69. Where the witness is a child, is the grand jury protecting the witness, the prose-
cutor, or the defendant, by refusing to allow the child's request for parental accompani-
ment during the grand jury interrogation? See People v. Minet, 296 N.Y. 315, 73 N.E.2d
529 (1947).
70. Commonwealth v. Mead, 12 Gray 167, 170, 71 Am. Dec. 741 (Mass. 1858).
71. The advice given to prosecutors in the P.L.I. short course for prosecuting attor-
neys is ilnuminative:
However, a grand jury can, of course, act independently, without a preliminary
hearing, where this is desired. Such cases may arise when you fear that witnesses
may be tampered with, or where, for tactical reasons, you wish the defense to
remain ignorant of your evidence, or where you wish to protect a witness from
publicity, as in sex or extortion cases, or where undercover agents, such as nar-
cotics squad men or co-defendants are used as witnesses .... There is no purpose
in straining to get a doubtful indictment. Dismissals and acquittals will not en-
hance the record of a prosecutor's office. . . . Pragmatically you will not want
to obtain indictments in cases you cannot win.
Practising Law Institute, Manual for Prosecuting Attorneys 368, 371 (Ploscowe ed. 1956).
See People v. Edwards, 19 Misc. 2d 412, 189 N.Y.S.2d 39 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1959).
72. In a comprehensive study by Wayne Morse, then Associate Professor of Law at
the University of Oregon, out of 6453 cases from 21 states during the fall and winter terms
of 1929-30 it was found that only 348 cases out of the total criminal cases considered by
the grand jury involved differences of opinion between prosecutors and grand juries as to
disposition of the cases or 5.39%. Morse, Survey of the Grand Jury System, 10 Ore. L.
Rev. 154 (1931).
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yet the best available statistics indicate that an incredibly small percentage of
criminal cases originate with the grand jury.
73
In summation, it is submitted that traditional grand jury roles have become
debilitated in recent years as a result of irreconcilable intra-role conflict and in
the face of inevitable social change. Each of the roles has had its effectiveness
challenged-the role of inquisitor by modern professional police forces, the
role of reporter by local representative government and the free press, and the
role of protector by informations filed by an elected public prosecutor supple-
mented by the right to an open preliminary hearing.
The majority of the states have found it advantageous to combine the
benefits of the old and new by using the information system while retaining
the grand jury system for occasional and specialized use, seemingly a wise
choice.7 4 Although New York would have to resort to constitutional amendment
to effectuate a similar reform,75 this might be preferred to a continuation of
internecine conflict caused by misdirected devotion to history and tradition. It
will be interesting to observe whether New York will replace the reportorial
horse in the troika so as to conform to the original design, or struggle along
with the remaining two. Then again, might the ancient vehicle finally be
replaced with modern machinery?
73. In a total of 7414 criminal cases considered by grand juries under the same con-
ditions as noted in the previous footnote, grand juries initiated criminal prosecutions in
only 353 or 4.76% of the total cases. The New York figures were even more significant,
showing only two cases out of 842. Id. at 134.
74. It will have been observed that most of the comparative studies of the grand jury
vs. the information system go back approximately thirty years. It is perhaps a comment
by itself that the latest survey on the administration of criminal justice in the United States,
that undertaken by the American Bar Foundation and conducted mostly in 1956-58, is of
no assistance on this question since the three states selected for study, Wisconsin, Kansas,
and Michigan, make predominate, if not exclusive, use of the information rather than the
grand jury.
75. Neither the Fifth Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution require the states to initiate state felony prosecutions by grand jury
indictment. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
